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CALABRESrS THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A GENERATION OF
IMPACT ON LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP
DONALD G. GIFFoRD*
FoREWORD
In 1965, Guido Calabresi, then a young Yale Law School Profes-
sor, was on sabbatical in Italy writing a draft of what would become his
book, The Costs of Accidents.' While in Europe, he was invited to the
Max-Plank-Institut fftr Ausldndisches und Internationales Privatrecht
in Hamburg to talk about his work with law and economics. Professor
Calabresi delivered the lecture, and at its conclusion, the Direktor of
the Institut, Professor Dr. Konrad Zweigert, said, "Very interesting.
Very interesting indeed." He continued, "But you must understand.
This is not law. And this is not legal scholarship." Whereupon the
young American professor replied, "It may not be now. But it will be
soon."2
On April 23 and 24, 2004, a distinguished group of judges and
professors assembled at the University of Maryland School of Law to
assess whether developments in legal scholarship and in the law have
confirmed Calabresi's prediction. ' How has publication of The Costs
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. GuIDO CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
2. The account of the conversation between Professor Guido Calabresi and Professor
Dr. Konrad Zweigert is taken from my telephone conversation with Judge Calabresi on
April 8, 2004.
3. The Symposium, Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents: A Generation of Impact on Law
and Scholarship, wasjoindy sponsored by the University of Maryland School of Law and the
Maryland Law Review. We express our thanks to Judge Guido Calabresi, not only for his
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of Accidents contributed to the emergence and maturing of the disci-
pline known as law and economics? How have the perspectives of
scholars and judges in viewing tort law been affected by the famous
"Calabresian lens"?
This issue of the Maryland Law Review publishes the papers
presented at the Symposium, Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents: A Gen-
eration of Impact on Law and Scholarship. The papers, presented as por-
tions of loosely related panels, were disparate ones. As Professor Anita
Bernstein remarked at the Symposium, "This book is a great signifier.
It's a book that you can hand to two dozen people and say, 'Tell me
what it says or what you think about it,' and get a huge variety of an-
swers or insights." Yet major themes emerged during the Symposium
that cut across the various panels. In this Foreword, I consider some
of these major themes.
The first theme is that law and economics is a broadly defined
field of scholarly inquiry that encompasses many different perspec-
tives; the differences among scholars in the field may be at least as
important as any shared common tenets. Professor Keith N. Hylton,
in his intellectual history of the development of law and economics,
divides the field using three sets of contrasting criteria: positive versus
normative, positivist versus anti-positivist, and belief in the strong
form of rationality contrasted with the weak form of rationality.4 He
finds Calabresi's contributions in The Costs of Accidents to be "clearly"
normative,5 as contrasted with Posner's scholarship that "rejected the
reform efforts of Calabresi ... [and] defended the law as it is." 6 Hyl-
ton laments, however, the predominance of normative analysis in con-
temporary law and economics scholarship without greater efforts to
apply law and economics to understand the existing common law. He
also contrasts Calabresi's approach of weak rationality, in which actors
vigorous participation in the two-day Symposium, but also for his assistance in planning it.
We also want to express our appreciation to Dean Karen H. Rothenberg for her sponsor-
ship and support of the Symposium; to Associate Dean Richard Boldt for the key role he
played in conceiving of the Symposium and making it a reality; and to Professor Emeritus
Oscar S. Gray for all his contributions. Richard Boldt, along with University of Maryland
School of Law Professors Richard A. Booth, David Hyman (now at the University of Illi-
nois), Jana B. Singer, and Marley Weiss superbly moderated the panels at the Symposium.
LuAnn Marshall, Nancy Zibron, MaryJo Rodney, John Stylc, and Dave Fagan provided the
administrative support that made the Symposium run smoothly. Finally, the Symposium
was made possible by generous financial support from Morton P. Fisher, Jr.; Foundation
Press; The Pearl, Lawrence I., and Lloyd M. Gerber Memorial Lecture Fund; and Richard
J. Himelfarb.
4. Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L.
REv. 85 (2005).
5. Id. at 91.
6. Id. at 90.
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generally act in rational ways, but with consistent deviations, with the
strong rationality version of Judge Richard A. Posner and others iden-
tified with the Chicago School.
The differences between the law and economics of Posner and of
Calabresi are evident in each of their own articles. Shortly after the
publication of The Costs of Accidents, the book was reviewed critically by
Posner, another of the founders of the law and economics move-
ment.7 As the opening speaker for the Symposium, Posner acknowl-
edged that by creating "an analytical framework that others could use
to formulate and advocate practical legal improvements," The Costs of
Accidents made "a classic contribution to legal thought,"' but he indi-
cated that he was "inclined to stand by [his earlier] criticisms."9 Pos-
ner defends the fault system and claims that the limited research
available supports his view that the existing system yields a variety of
benefits, including deterring harmful conduct, decentralizing the
goal of preventing accidents, and minimizing the bureaucratic admin-
istration of accident prevention. In response, Calabresi concludes
that although using economic analysis to criticize, explain, and justify
existing legal rules is appropriate, the discipline of law and the disci-
pline of economics, as they interact with each other, are also capable
of creating a synergistic cycle of refinement and reform.'
Adam Benforado and Professor Jon Hanson analyze Calabresi's
and Posner's very different views of law and economics using concepts
borrowed from social psychology." They view Posner as representa-
tive of the "relative" dispositionist whose analysis proceeds from the
belief that "[t]he individual is presumed to be an independent,
choice-making agent whose acts both satisfy and reveal a set of under-
lying preferences." 12 In contrast, according to Benforado and Han-
son, "Calabresi stands as a relative situationist in a particularly
dispositionist school of thought"; 3 he "has the instincts of a social
psychologist,"1 4 and differs from those who would "ignore the more
significant role played by situational forces-unseen or under-
appreciated features in our environment and in our interiors.""
7. Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 636 (1970).
8. Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment, 64 MD.
L. REv. 12, 23 (2005).
9. Id. at 12.
10. Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REv. 736 (2005).
11. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Costs of Dispositionism: The Premature Demise of
Situationist Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REv. 24 (2005).
12. Id. at 34.
13. Id. at 30.
14. Id. at 59.
15. Id. at 29.
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Benforado and Hanson suggest that both Calabresi's and Posner's in-
tellectual development were influenced greatly by their differing reac-
tions to changing intellectual trends emerging during the 1960s:
Calabresi seems to have embraced "the general push toward situation-
ism," while Posner was one of a number of scholars that "lashed back
in an attempt to legitimate the systems that were being upended by
situationist thinking. 1 6
In her paper considering the disparate strands of law and eco-
nomics theory, Professor Bernstein goes so far as to suggest that "law
and economics [has] lost its distinctive characteristics" that have
served as a "basis for dividing the legal academy into members and
nonmembers."' 7 According to Bernstein, many of the tenets once
held by law and economics, including "rational choice, utilitarianism,
efficiency, wealth maximization, markets, predictive power, and co-
herence have been questioned, abandoned, or smudged beyond rec-
ognition."' 8  The widespread acceptance of other notions often
previously identified with law and economics, such as "an explicit de-
sire to make policy, an apparent taste for better-offness in a Kaldor-
Hicks sense, and an affinity for ex ante perspectives on the law" have
"triumphed" and have been so pervasively absorbed into legal thought
that they are no longer defining characteristics.' 9 Nothing may be left
of law and economics as a separate discipline, charges Bernstein,
other than "a faculty club."2"
The second theme that emerged throughout the Symposium was
the need for a greater commitment to empirical research to deter-
mine how legal rules and legal institutions affect the behavior of par-
ties in the real world. Despite their considerable differences, both
Judge Posner and Judge Calabresi call for such research. Posner takes
issue with Calabresi's critical analysis of the traditional tort system be-
cause it was based on a priori reasoning, and "involved no inquiry into
the actual operation of the fault system."21 Calabresi, while standing
by his critique of the fault system, acknowledges that in The Costs of
Accidents he dismissed the fault system "immediately, and almost intui-
tively,"22 and that the issue of which accident compensation system
16. Id. at 65.
17. Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REv. 303, 332
(2005).
18. Id. at 324.
19. Id. at 328.
20. Id. at 308.
21. Posner, supra note 8, at 18.
22. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 748.
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can best reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and accident preven-
tion is an empirical question.2 3
While Calabresi and Posner both address the benefits of empiri-
cal research, Professor Robert L. Rabin laments what he calls the "crit-
ical intellectual vacuum . . . in the empirical realm" that remains a
generation after the publication of The Costs of Accidents. 24 Rabin
surveys the failure of both legislatures and courts to advance signifi-
cantly "the renaissance" of experimentation with accident plans that
Calabresi anticipated at the time of the book's publication. This fail-
ure to adopt innovative alternative plans, according to Rabin, has re-
sulted from concerns about horizontal equity that are inherent in
legislatively carving out a narrow subcategory of injuries for special-
ized treatment within a no-fault system, from the pragmatic realities of
legislative politics, and from the unwillingness of courts to venture
into areas where they perceive that they lack institutional competence
compared with the legislative branch.
While acknowledging the need for greater empirical study, Judge
Calabresi also defends the continued use of theoretical model-build-
ing in his concluding article.2 5 He suggests that model-making identi-
fies what "boxes" might exist, and then the question becomes whether
these theoretically derived boxes are "full" or "empty" in the real
world. The advantage of model-making, according to Calabresi, is
that the model may cause the scholar to look for something that his
canonical viewpoint would otherwise cause him to miss. In one of the
highlights of this Symposium issue, Professor Frank I. Michelman re-
opens a debate-dormant for more than thirty years-between Cala-
bresi and himself on the topic of liability and property rules and, in
doing so, illustrates the benefits of model-building in legal analysis.
26
In his original review of The Costs of Accidents, Michelman, as a scholar
of property law, applied concepts from the book to create a right/
remedy typology for private nuisance.27 By separating "liability" enti-
tlements from "property" entitlements, he identified three possible
outcomes of a plaintiff's action seeking relief from a private nuisance
caused by a polluter: dismissal of the plaintiffs action, an injunction,
and damages without injunctive relief (which Michelman, in the in-
stant article, clarifies to be "pay-as-you-go"-or temporary-dam-
23. Id. at 749.
24. Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 699,
733 (2005).
25. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 752-53.
26. Frank I. Michelman, "There Have to Be Fou9', 64 MD. L. REV. 136 (2005).
27. Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971) (book review).
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ages28). Subsequent to Michelman's original review, in the famousCathedral article, Calabresi and Douglas Melamed identified a fourthpossibility: the possibility of a purchased injunction29  (which
Michelman here re-categorizes as a "compensated restrictive real cove-
nant""°). In his article in this issue, Michelman identifies two addi-
tional remedial outcomes. First, the compensated restrictive real
covenant-previously recognized only as a single possibility-can be
subdivided into either compensated restrictive real covenants specifi-
cally enforceable or compensated restrictive real covenants enforceable
only by damages for breach.3" Second, the plaintiff's remedy for dam-
ages, again recognized in the past as a single option, in fact consists of
two separate remedial outcomes: (1) "pay-as-you-go" (temporary dam-
ages), and (2) permanent damages (Michelman describes the latter as
a "lump-sum" compensated easement).32 Michelman now claims that,just as Calabresi and Melamed had raised the bid to four in their 1972
article, he has now upped the bid to six remedial entitlements. The
significance of this is that Michelman recognizes the limitations of the
Hohfeldian "duple analysis"33 that had structured the dialogue in thepast between Calabresi and Melamed, on one hand, and Michelmanhimself, on the other hand. The criterion of remedial outcome joins
the criteria of the liability decision (which looks backward) and the
entitlement decision (which looks forward) to generate the additional
possible outcomes. Michelman's analysis thus exposes the profounddifference between Hohfeldian analysis and the analysis of Calabresi
and Melamed: "From The Cathedral we view law, not in its aspect of afield of struggle for life, but rather in its aspect of a forum of public-
minded, policy-analytic intelligence."34 In this statement, Michelman
captures the essential difference between the tort law of generationsprior to The Costs of Accidents and tort law as conceptualized by Cala-
bresi and many others in our own time.
A third major theme of the Symposium, illustrated by a number
of panelists, was that something is lost if tort law, and the law moregenerally, are viewed solely-or even predominantly-through an in-
strumental lens. Professor Jules Coleman's article clearly articulates
28. Michelman, supra note 26, at 155 tbl.F.
29. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
30. Michelman, supra note 26, at 147 tbl.C.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 155 tbl.F.
33. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
34. Michelman, supra note 26, at 157 (footnote omitted).
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the differences between a predominantly instrumental approach to
tort law, such as Calabresi's, and a corrective justice perspective.
Coleman sees the conceptual argument of The Costs of Accidents as
moving tort law analysis away from addressing an "accident"-an un-
fortunate event between two parties-and transforming it instead into
an analysis of "accidents"-a social and economic problem. What is
lost when tort law becomes a technology to solve a social problem,
according to Coleman, is "the rich moral character of tort law," which
"is a way of expressing the nature of responsible agency to one an-
other in our legal practices."" In a similar vein, the article of Profes-
sors John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky defends the
common-law tort system and its focus on obligation and redress
against the instrumental critiques of Calabresi and others.
37 Goldberg
and Zipursky argue that the common law fulfills a number of goals
other than the reduction of the costs of accidents, including elaborat-
ing and enforcing norms of conduct and dispersing power within the
political system to enable individuals to demand accountability. The
set of articles from the panel on The Costs of Accidents and Reform
concludes with the article of Justice Izhak Englard,
38 who, in a 1980
article, criticized the publication of The Costs of Accidents for ignoring
what he called the complex psychological factors supporting correc-
tive justice goals of the tort system, including retribution and retalia-
tion.3 o In his article in this Symposium issue, Englard argues that the
"legal Cathedral" remains an inherently pluralistic one, in which
judges in a single mental process simultaneously consider goals of
compensation and retribution, as well as distribution and allocation.
4
"
This pluralism of aims and methods in the judicial process, concludes
Englard, is a "reality, like human life."'"
Similarly, the three articles presented as a part of the panel on
Justice and the Role of Economic Theory consider how economic-based
standards may inadequately serve the interests of justice. Professor
Gregory C. Keating considers the "tragic conflict" between the price-
lessness of human life and the necessity of acknowledging that some
35. Jules Coleman, The Costs of The Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REv. 337 (2005).
36. Id. at 353.
37. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L.
REV. 364 (2005).
38. Izhak Englard, The Costs of Accidents: A Retrospect View from the Cathedral, 64 MD. L.
RaV. 355 (2005).
39. Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 33-36 (1980).
40. Englard, supra note 38, at 361.
41. Id.
20051
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 64:1
accidents are not worth preventing.42 He concludes that although
such trade-offs are inevitable, they need not be made on the basis of
market-based or cost-benefit criteria, but can be based on other stan-dards. As he notes, regulatory approaches often use an alternative cri-terion such as reducing risks to the extent feasible or to the point
where the activity is deemed "safe." Ultimately, Keating concludes
that we may be expecting too much of "fair norms of accident law." 43
Regardless of the standard that society chooses to determine the
tradeoffs between the costs of accidents and the costs of accident pre-
vention, the accident compensation system still must operate against
society's "allocation of basic rights and [a] distribution of wealth, in-
come, and property"44 that constitutes "backgroundjustice."" Profes-
sor Ugo Mattei argues that the early Calabresian version of law and
economics, aided by the political agenda of Reagan-Thatcher eco-
nomics and globalization, established "hegemony" of American legal
scholarship worldwide. 46 The later adoption by the law and econom-ics movement of an extreme ideology of individualization and prop-
erty rights, argues Mattei, has led to a decline of the worldwide impact
of law and economics scholarship specifically and American legal
scholarship more generally. Mattei asserts, "When an approach to thelaw loses its critical strengths and merely legitimizes a status quo, itbetrays the function that in Western law has always granted prestige to
academic thinking: a strong independent check on the political pro-
cess."4 7 Hanoch Sheinman explores Calabresi's two goals of accidentlaw, justice and cost reduction.4 ' He argues that both justice and wel-fare are independently valuable goals of accident law and challenges
the claim, attributed to Ronald Dworkin, that "welfare is not a distinct,intrinsically normative value, and in any event.., its value depends onjustice in a way that renders conflicts [between the two goals]
impossible."49
In his paper, Judge Calabresi notes that one of the contributions
of The Costs of Accidents was to "bring back" deterrence as a goal of tort
42. Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REv.
159, 159 (2005).
43. Id. at 217.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 216 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT §§ 14-15, at50-55 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)).
46. Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido Calabresi,
64 MD. L. REv. 220 (2005).
47. Id. at 248.
48. Hanoch Sheinman, Are Tradeoffs Between Justice and Welfare Possible? Calabresi andDworkin on the Normative Foundations of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REv. 250 (2005).
49. Id at 285.
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law, but to look at it from a structural point of view rather than from
an individual point of view. 50 A number of papers presented in this
issue use the analytical framework of The Costs of Accidents to analyze
the deterrent function of tort law in a variety of contexts. In their
article, Professors Francesco Parisi and Vincy Fon consider the alter-
native of distributing the costs of an accident on the basis of the par-
ties' relative causal contributions, either in the absence of other
liability rules or in conjunction with negligence rules.
51 Parisi and
Fon conclude that causal contribution rules, in conjunction with neg-
ligence rules, may induce both parties to moderate their activities
leading to harm, a combination of incentives that they claim is pro-
duced by no existing liability regime.
Professor Michael L. Rustad begins the Symposium panel on pu-
nitive damages by arguing that a series of Supreme Court decisions
since 1991, eagerly pursued by corporate America, "threatens the well-
established functions of punitive damages developed over two centu-
ries of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 52 He argues that by focusing
solely on the "microanalysis of individual retributive justice," the Su-
preme Court misses the opportunity to examine "the macrosociologi-
cal functions of punitive damages" such as those suggested by
Calabresi's argument that deterrence should be viewed from a struc-
tural-rather than from an individual-perspective.
5 3  Professor
AnthonyJ. Sebok argues that even if we accept the characterization of
at least some punitive damages by Judge Calabresi in Ciraolo v. City of
New York 54 as "socially compensatory" damages-reflecting harm to
victims other than the plaintiff before the court-or perhaps view
them in other cases as a penalty functioning as a part of a system that
Calabresi would refer to as specific deterrence, similar to fines, these
damages still are subject to the constraints imposed by the Due Pro-
cess Clause.55 Judge Calabresi's notion that deterrence should be
seen as a structural goal, and not just from the point of view of an
individual wrongdoer, is also reflected in Professor Catherine M.
Sharkey's paper analyzing the historically frequent blanket prohibi-
50. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 744.
51. Francesco Parisi & Vincy Fon, Causation and Responsibility: The Compensation 
Principle
from Grotius to Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REv. 108 (2005).
52. Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court That Would 
Be King
of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REv. 461, 540 (2005).
53. Id. at 518.
54. 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2000).
55. AnthonyJ. Sebok, Deterrence orDisgorgement? ReadingCiraolo After Campbell, 
64 MD.
L. REv. 541 (2005).
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tion against insurance for punitive damages. 6 Sharkey argues that
the expanded role of punitive damages in recent decades, including
serving as socially compensatory damages, is another way in which thelegal system attempts to compensate harms and penalize injurers on a
societal scale. Once these new roles of punitive damages are under-
stood, argues Sharkey, blanket prohibitions against the insurability ofpunitive damages are no longer justifiable and should be replaced by
a test based upon whether the conduct causing the harm was inten-
tional or accidental.
Professor Kenneth S. Abraham's article explores the critical role
of liability insurance in achieving deterrence from a structural point
of view.57 He traces the relationship between insurance and accidentprevention from the mid-nineteenth century to the current time.
Abraham chronicles how liability insurance initially was regarded aslegitimate because it provided a source of available funds to compen-
sate the injured victim. By the mid-twentieth century, however, aca-demic commentators and courts alike recognized a second function
of liability insurance: loss spreading. According to Abraham, Cala-bresi was among the first to analyze how the setting of insurance pre-
miums contributed to accident prevention. Abraham argues that in
the arena of mass products, liability insurance premiums are likely tobe more proportional to the degree of risk than in other, more spo-
radic, accident contexts, and, therefore, the argument that liability in-
surance premiums will mitigate accident prevention incentives is
weaker in the mass products context. My own paper uses an analysis
suggested by The Costs of Accidents to question whether liability damagejudgments achieve their deterrence goals, either from a structural per-
spective or from the perspective of an individual defendant, in the
specific context of the manufacture and distribution of mass products,
such as cigarettes, asbestos products, and lead pigment, that are fungi-
ble, or nearly so, and cause latent diseases decades after their
production. 8
Judge Guido Calabresi has the last word in this Symposium issue.In his introduction of Calabresi, Professor Oscar S. Gray remembers
their common teacher, Professor Fleming James, Jr., whose teaching
focused on how society manages the costs of accidents. 59 Judge Cala-
56. Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV.
409 (2005).
57. Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention: The Evolution of an
Idea, 64 MD. L. REv. 573 (2005).
58. Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting from Mass
Products, 64 MD. L. REv. 613 (2005).
59. Oscar S. Gray, Introduction of Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REv. 734 (2005).
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bresi then reflects back as a mature judge and scholar on The Costs of
Accidents, which he describes as "a young book."
6
" He acknowledges
several weaknesses in the book, including some of the issues raised by
other papers in this Symposium issue. For example, he acknowledges
that his treatment of the role of justice was inadequate, 6' and that
there was no discussion of "shaping tastes" or "formulating values" as a
goal of law.62 Calabresi notes, however, that The Costs of Accidents was
the first attempt to analyze the multiple functions of tort law-loss
minimization, distributional equity, achieving the optimal degree of
loss spreading, and minimizing administrative costs-in relation to
each other.63
Calabresi acknowledges that the fault system as it operates today,
with comparative responsibility, is a very different system than the gen-
erally all-or-nothing regime that he criticized in The Costs of Accidents.
He asserts that the continuing vitality within tort law of a link between
a particular victim and a particular injurer may have less to do with
the values described by Coleman, and Goldberg and Zipursky, than
with the political power of trial lawyers who "have been able to main-
tain [the system] to their distributional advantage. "64
Calabresi also hints at the future direction of his own thinking
about accident law: "the relationship of accident law and fault to our
generalized system of free enterprise."65 He suggests that entrepre-
neurs function in a free market system that parallels a strict liability
system, not a fault-based environment. When a business fails, Cala-
bresi notes, society does not relieve the entrepreneur of the conse-
quences even if her initial analysis of the costs and benefits of her
products or services was reasonable.
Calabresi concludes that The Costs of Accidents was a "pretty good
book"6 6 that attempted to use what we know as lawyers and institution-
alists to push forward economic theory and then to apply this more
sophisticated economic theory to the law of accidents. It is my hope
that this Symposium issue, Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents: A Gener-
ation of Impact on Law and Scholarship, in some small way, moves for-
ward the dialectic described by Calabresi about the ideas expounded
in his "pretty good book."
60. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 738.
61. Id. at 745.
62. Id. at 747.
63. Id. at 742-43.
64. Id. at 751.
65. Id. at 750.
66. Id. at 738.
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